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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FRANK H. FULLMER, DAVID H. 
FULLMER and WILLARD L. 
FULLMER, JR., individually, and 
as co-partners doing business under 
the name and style of FULLMER 
BROS., a co-partnership; WILLIAM 
L. PEREIRA doing business as WIL-
LIAM L. PEREIRA & ASSOCI-
ATES ; WILLIAM L. PEREIRA & 
ASSOCIATES, a corporation; and 
ALLEN STEEL COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case concerns the validity of plaintiff's 
(hereinafter referred to by name or by "Plaintiff") 
three separate services of summons upon defendant 
William L. Pereira & Associates, a California corp-
oration (hereinafter referred to by name or by 
"Defendant"). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Following the hearing on defendant's motion 
to quash two of plaintiff's services of summons on 
defendant, Third District Judge A. H. Ellett by 
Amended Judgment entered on October 26, 1964, 
granted defendant's motion and quashed two of 
1 
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plaintiff's services of summons upon defendant, and 
the court on its own motion quashed plaintiffs third 
service of summons upon defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Amended Judg-
ment quashing plaintiff's services of summons upon 
defendant, and for judgment that defendant was 
properly served with summons, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case are contained in the Com-
plaint on file herein, the Amended Judgment of the 
District Court ordering service of summons quashed, 
and the affidavits submitted by the parties to the 
District Court, and are parenthetically designated 
as such, with reference to page and paragraph. 
On December 23, 1959, plaintiff entered into 
an Architect's Agreement with defendant William 
L. Pereira & Associates, a California corporation, 
whereby said defendant agreed to provide architec-
tural, engineering and supervision services to plain-
tiff in connection with the design and construction 
of the Prudential Federal Savings Building in Salt 
Lake City. (Complaint, R. 15, Para. HI) . The rele-
vant provisions of this agreement relating to de-
fendant's duties thereunder are as follows: 
"5 The architect's services during construc-
tion shall include regular supervision. 
Regular supervision shall consist of: 
(c) The Architect and Owner agree that 
the Architect's full-time supervision is 
necessary . . . during the construction peri-
od; and that the Architect shall furnish 
the services of a qualified superintendent 
2 
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who will reside in Salt Lake City, Utah 
during the construction period." (Emph-
asis added). 
(d) The issuance of monthly estimates of 
amounts due the contractor for the por-
tions of work completed to date of certifi-
cation. 
(f) The furnishing of all interpretations, 
details or incidental services necessary for 
the proper execution of the work, includ-
ing the selection of colors, textures, and 
finishes. 
(g) The issuance to the Contractor or to 
the Construction Superintendent of any 
change orders which substantially alter 
the function, quality, appearance or cost 
of the finished work. Such change orders 
shall have the prior approval of the Own-
er's authorized representative before they 
become effective. Copies of change orders 
shall be sent to the office of the Owner at 
time of issuance. 
(h) The preparation, in collaboration with 
the Contractor or Construction Superin-
tendent, of a set of marked blueprints or 
u
as built" drawings which shall show all 
basic changes from the original contract 
requirements and the locations of covered 
sumps, sewer lines, cleanouts, water and 
gas mains, and electric service feeders. 
The correctness of said drawings and data 
shall be attested by both the Contractor 
or Construction Superintendent and the 
Architect, and a copy of said "as built'' 
drawing shall be filed With the Owner. 
(i) The checking and approval of the 
mechanical system by the mechanical en-
gineering designer prior to issuance of the 
3 
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completion certificate, together with in-
structions to the custodian as to operation 
procedure. 
(j) The checking of accounts in connec-
tion with the construction phase of the 
project in sufficient detail as to enable 
him to intellingently certify to their cor-
rectness before final payment is made to 
the Contractor. 
(k) The issuance of a completion certi-ficate when all work called for by the 
drawings and specifications has been satis-
factorily completed." (R. 77, 78, 79) 
On July 19, 1962, plaintiff entered into a con-
struction contract with Fullmer Bros., a co-partner-
ship, whereby said Fullmer Bros, agreed to provide 
the labor and materials necessary for the construc-
tion and completion of the building in accordance 
with the drawings and specificaltions prepared by 
defendant. (Complaint R. 17, 18, Para. X). Shortly 
thereafter, Fullmer Bros, entered into a subcontract 
with Allen Steel Company for the fabrication and 
erection of the steel framework of the building. 
(Complaint R. 20, Para. XIX). 
The project was commenced early in the year 
1962, and was scheduled for completion and occu-
pancy on December 1,1963. (Complaint R. 16, Para. 
HI). However, due to errors in the design, construc-
tion and fabrication of two large horizontal steel 
girders forming the main support of the building 
and in the fabrication and erection of the structural 
steel framework for the building, extensive repairs 
and corrective work were required and consequently 
4 
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the building was not ready for occupancy until June 
of 1964. (Compaint R. 16, Para. I l l) . 
On June 25, 1964, plaintiff commenced this 
action by filing with the Clerk of the District Court 
of Salt Lake County a complaint against defendants 
Pereira, Fullmer Bros, and Allen Steel Company 
seeking to recover damages suffered by plaintiff 
by reason of said errors in design, construction, fab-
rication and erection of the building. 
The matter before the Court concerns the val-
idity of the three separate services of summons and 
complaint made upon defendant Pereira by plain-
tiff and accomplished in the following manner: 
1) On June 25, 1964 in Salt Lake City, 
personal service of summons and a copy of the 
complaint was made upon James S. Manning, 
as defendant's agent and representative. 
2) On June 30, 1964, in Salt Lake City, 
service of summons and a copy of the com-
plaint was made upon the Secretary of State 
of the State of Utah. 
3) On July 29, 1964, in Salt Lake City, 
personal service of summons and a copy of 
the complaint was made upon George S. 
Mooney, as defendant's agent and representa-
tive. 
The trial court erroneously found each of these 
services to be invalid because: 
1) As to Manning, he "was induced to 
enter the State of Utah by plaintiff on or 
about June 25, 1964, for the sole purpose on 
5 
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part of plaintiff of obtaining service . . ." 
2) As to the Secretary of State, it was 
not"in compliance with or authorized by any 
statute of the State of Utah nor rule of civil 
procedure." 
3) As to Mooney, it was "attempted 
after defendant's motion to quash the service 
. . . on . . . Manning was filed and pending 
before the court and before the court had dis-
posed of said motion . . ." 
The District Court found that at all times rele-
vant to this decision the defendant was doing busi-
ness in the State of Utah (Amended Judgment, R. 
156, Para. 1) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS WITH RESPECT 
TO SERVICE UPON JAMES S. MANNING 
The superintendent appointed by defendant to 
reside in Salt Lake City during the construction 
period, and to perform the duties required under 
the provisions of the Architect's Agreement was 
James S. Manning. (Pereira affidavit, R. 123, para. 
9). This Agreement required the Architect to fur-
nish Regular Supervision "during construction," 
and defines Regular Supervision as including : 
1) full time supervision in Salt Lake City 
during construction; 
2) preparation of as-built drawings in colla-
boration with Contractor; 
3) approval of mechanical systems before is-
suance of a completion certificate; 
4) issuance of monthly estimates due con-
tractor; 
6 
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5) checking of accounts of Contractor so as 
to certify to their correctness before final 
payment to the Contractor; and 
6) issuance of a completion certificate when 
all work is satisfactorily completed by the 
Contractor. (R. 77,78,79) 
In 1962, Mr. Manning and his family established 
a residence in Salt Lake City, and he commenced 
performance of defendant's contractual obligation 
with plaintiff. (Manning affidavit 1, R. 31, para 6). 
Mr. Manning opened an office in Salt Lake City in 
defendant's name, hired a seceretary, obtained a 
telephone and listings in defendant's name in the 
Salt Lake City telephone directory, and from that 
office handled defendant's business with Brigham 
Young University at Provo, Utah, as well as with 
plaintiff. (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 104, para. 2, 3 
Exhibit A). 
In May of 1963, it was discovered that serious 
failure in the structural steel support for the build-
ing would require extensive repairs and that the 
completion of the building would consequently be 
delayed until at least some time in the spring of 
1964. (Donovan affidavit, R. 97, para. 5). 
During May of 1964, plaintiff and defendant 
had discussions concerning a possible breach of the 
contract between plaintiff and defendant, arising 
from alleged errors in design and in supervision of 
construction which caused the structural steel fail-
ures. Plaintiff at this time advised defendant that 
suit might be commenced against defendant because 
of its negligence and breach of contract. (Donovan 
7 
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affidavit, R. 98, para. 5; Staten affidavit, R. 116, 
para. 9). 
Mr. Manning left Salt Lake City on June 10, 
1964. At the time of his departure construction was 
incomplete even though plaintiff was hoping to be 
able to hold its grand opening on June 29. At this 
time no final punch list of uncompleted items of 
construction work had been issued by the defendant 
Architect to the Contractor. The Contractor fully 
expected and the job required that before June 29 a 
final punch list be issued by the defendant (Peter-
son affidavit, R. 139, para. 6). The completion of 
numerous items of construction work remained to 
be verified by Mr. Manning on defendant's behalf, 
and other contractual obligations of defendant, such 
as issuance of a final completion certificate and 
settlement of outstanding invoices, claims and liens 
for labor and materials had not been completed. 
(Kershisnik affidavit, R. 105, para. 5; Staten affi-
davit, R. 113, para. 4; Donovan affidavit, R. 99, 
para. 8; Peterson affidavit, R. 139, 140, para. 6, 7, 
8, 9; Manning affidavit 2, R. 149, para. 5.) In fact, 
the defendant has never issued a final punch list or 
completion certificate as required by the Architect's 
Agreement (Peterson affidavit, R. 140, para. 9). 
At the time when Mr. Manning left Salt Lake 
City on June 10, he told plaintiff and the Contractor 
that he would be returning to Salt Lake City once 
a week to complete work under the architect's con-
tract and spend in Salt Lake City whatever amount 
of time was required. (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 
105, para. 4; Peterson affidavit, R. 138, para. 5.) 
8 
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From June 10, 1964 on, Mr. Kershisnik, plaintiffs 
acting liaison officer between plaintiff, defendant 
and the general contractor, Fullmer Bros., continu-
ously urged, and was instructed by plaintiff's presi-
dent to urge, Mr. Manning to return to Salt Lake 
City to complete defendant's work. This was parti-
cularly necessary because of plaintiff's scheduled 
grand opening of the building on June 29. (Ker-
shisnik affidavit, R. 105, para. 5; Donovan affi-
davit, R. 99, para. 8). 
Finally, on June 19, 1964, Mr. Manning ad-
vised Mr. Kershisnik by phone that he would be 
returning to Salt Lake City on June 21 or June 22 
to perform certain portions of defendant's work 
for plaintiff. (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 106, para. 
5). On Sunday, June 21, Mr. Manning arrived in 
Salt Lake City, but he told Mr. Kershisnik that his 
other work in Provo, Utah for Brigham Young Uni-
versity and in Los Angeles required his presence, 
that he would be unable to do any work for plain-
tiff or remain in Salt Lake City, and he promised 
and agreed to adjust his schedule and to tentatively 
return to Salt Lake City on June 25. (Kershisnik 
affidavit, R. 106, para. 6; Donovan affidavit, R. 
99, para. 7, and R. 100, para. 9). 
It is highly significant that none of these ar-
rangements made by Mr. Manning on June 21 are 
in any way denied by defendant. 
At the time Mr. Manning conferred with Mr. 
Kershisnik in Salt Lake City on June 21, neither 
Mr. Kershisnik nor any other of plaintiff's person-
9 
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nel, nor its attorneys had any knowledge of the 
possibility of serving Mr. Manning with a copy of 
the complaint and summons on June 25, nor did Mr. 
Kershisnik nor any of plaintiff's personnel, nor its 
attorneys, at this time have any intent or expecta-
of having Mr. Manning served on June 25. (Kershis-
nik affidavit, R. 107, para. 8, and R. 110, para 16; 
Donovan affidavit, R. 98, 99„ para. 7, and R. 100, 
para. 10). Moreover, at the time of Mr. Manning's 
discussion with Mr. Kershisnik on June 21, none 
of the attorneys for plaintiff had any knowledge 
of Mr. Manning's tentative return on June 25, nor 
even of his absence from Salt Lake City. (Staten 
affidavit, R. 114, para. 4; Riter afidavit, R. 133, 
134, para. 7; Donovan affidavit, R. 98, 99, para 7). 
On June 23, Mr. Manning by phone again con-
firmed to Mr. Kershisnik that he would arrive in 
Salt Lake City on the evening of June 24 to com-
ment performance of defendant's work. (Kershis-
nik affidavit, R. 106, 107, para. 7; Manning affi-
davit 1, R. 31, 32, para. 8). 
On June 23, 1964, plaintiff's President, Gene 
Donovan (not including Mr. Kershisnik) held a 
meeting with its attorneys to discuss preliminary 
drafts of the proposed complaint herein; at said 
meeting it was decided to put the complaint into 
final form for filing prior to the grand opening 
of the building, scheduled for June 29, 1964. (Don-
ovan affidavit, R. 98, para. 7). 
On the morning of June 24, 1964, plaintiff's 
counsel advised plaintiff's president, Mr. Donovan, 
10 
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that the complaint was ready for filing, and asked 
plaintiff's President, Mr. Donovan, for information 
as to the availability of defendant or its agents for 
service of process. (Donovan affidavit, R. 99, para. 
7; Riter affidavit, R. 133, para. 7). Mr. Donovan, 
not having nor knowing such information, called 
Mr. Kershisnik into his office, and Mr. Kershisnik 
then informed Mr. Donovan and plaintiff's attor-
neys for the first time, of Mr. Manning's promised 
return to Salt Lake City that evening, to wit: June 
24, 1964. (Donovan affidavit, R. 98, 99, para. 7; 
Riter affidavit, R. 133, para. 7; Staten affidavit, 
R. 113,114, para. 4). 
At no time prior to this meeting on June 24, 
1964 did plaintiff's attorneys have any knowledge 
of the fact that Mr. Manning had promised to re-
turn to Salt Lake City on the evening of June 24, 
or that Mr. Manning had ever departed from Salt 
Lake City. (Staten affidavit, R. 113, 114, para, 4; 
Donovan affidavit, R. 98, 99, para. 7; Riter affi-
davit, R. 133, 134, para. 7). Moreover, at no time 
prior to June 24, 1964, did any of plaintiff's em-
ployees or personnel, including Mr. Kershisnik, have 
any knowledge that a complaint might be in final 
form for filing and service, or of the possibility of 
service upon defendant during Mr. Manning's visit 
on June 24 and 25. (Donovan affidavit, R. 98, 99, 
para. 7; Kershisnik -affidavit, R. 107, para. 9). 
Upon learning on June 24, 1964 of Mr. Man-
ning's promised arrival in Salt Lake City that even-
ing, arrangements were then made for serving him 
11 
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with summons and a copy of the complaint. Such 
service was made upon Mr. Manning in his room 
at the Hotel Utah in Salt Lake City on the follow-
ing morning, June 25, 1964. (Staten affidavit, R. 
115, para. 7). When this service was made, Mr. 
Manning and Mr. Kershisnik were discussing in-
voices and correspondence as required by the 'archi-
tects contract dating back to the first of June which 
had not been processed. (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 
108, para. 12; Staten affidavit, R. 116, para. 8). 
After service had been made, Mr. Manning con-
tinued to undertake certain matters of business be-
tween the parties with respect to the completion 
of the building, as required by the architects con-
tract, including examination of part of the struc-
ture and discussion with representatives of Fullmer 
Bros., the general contractor, concerning the retard-
ed progress of the work and the final punch list. 
(Kershisnik affidavit, R. 109, 110, para. 14; Peter-
son affidavit, R. 140, 141, para. 10). 
Defendant on July 14, 1964, moved to quash 
service of process obtained by service upon Mr. 
Manning on the ground that such service was pro-
cured by fraudulently enticing Mr. Manning into 
the State of Utah. The District Court ordered the 
service quashed on the ground that Mr. Manning 
was "induced to enter the State of Utah by plain-
tiff for the sole purpose on part of plaintiff of 
obtaining service of summons and complaint." 
(Amended Judgment, R. 157, para. 6). 
12 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS WITH RESPECT 
TO SERVICE UPON THE 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
Defendant at all times material to the instant 
proceeding, was and is a corporation organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of California. 
(Pereira affidavit, R. 121, para. 2). At all times 
material hereto, defendant was doing business in 
the State of Utah. (Amended Judgment, R. 156, 
para. 1.) Defendant has never procured a certifi-
cate of authority to do business in Utah, as required 
by section 16-10-102 of the Utah Code. (Pereira 
affidavit, R. 121, para. 2; Staten affidavit, R. 117, 
para. 12 (b).) 
On June 30, 1964, the summons and a copy of 
the complaint was served upon the Secretary of 
State of the State of Utah. Even though defendant 
had not moved to quash this service, the District 
Court held that such service was void since "not in 
compliance with nor authorized by any statute of 
the State of Utah nor rule of court procedure." 
(Amended Judgment, R. 157, para. 5). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS WITH RESPECT 
TO SERVICE ON MR. MOONEY 
Mr. Mooney was the Construction Superinten-
dent or Chief Superintendent for defendant during 
the course of construction of plaintiff's building. 
(Donovan affidavit, R. 100, para. 12). Service was 
made upon him on July 29, 1964, while he was in 
Salt Lake City discussing with plaintiff matters re-
lating to the mechanical systems in plaintiff's build-
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ing (the air conditioning system). By the specific 
terms of plaintiff's contract with defendant, defen-
dant was required to check and approve the mechan-
ism system prior to issuance of the completion cer-
tificate (Contract, R. 79, para. 5(i)) and Mr. 
Mooney was engaged in performing this contractual 
obligation on behalf of defendant at the time serv-
ice was made. (Donovan affidavit, R. 100,101, para. 
12; Mooney affidavit, R. 119, para. 6). 
The District Court held that service upon Mr. 
Mooney was void because it was made after de-
fendant's motion to quash the service of summons 
on James S. Manning was filed and pending, and 
before the court had disposed of defendant's said 
motion to quash. (Amended Judgment, R. 157, 
para. 7). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SERVICE UPON DEFENDANT BY PERSONAL 
SERVICE UPON MR. MANNING WAS VALID SINCE 
HE WAS NOT INDUCED BY FRAUD OR OTHER 
DECEIT TO ENTER THE STATE OF UTAH FOR THE 
SOLE PURPOSE OF SERVING HIM WITH PROCESS. 
Initially, it should be pointed out that the 
Amended Judgment entered by the District Court 
was based exclusively upon the affidavits, stipula-
tions and statements of points and authorities sub-
mitted by both parties herein. (Amended Judgment, 
R. 155). No oral testimony was offered, and no 
cross-examination undertaken before the court. In 
these circumstances, the principle that findings of 
the lower court will not be set aside when the evi-
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dence is conflicting, unless the evidence is clearly 
insufficient, is not applicable. Even if it were, the 
evidence supporting the validity of the services of 
summons here is plentiful, convincing and uncon-
troverted by defendant, and defendant's conclusion-
ary allegations supporting its motions to quash are 
clearly insufficient. 
Where the evidence in the trial court consists 
entirely documentary material and affidavits, it 
is abundantly clear that this Court will and should 
review the evidence de novo in determining the merit 
of defendant's motions to quash. As early as 1900 
this Court recognized that in all cases wherein reso-
lution of the matter depends solely upon an exam-
ination of affidavits or depositions, the matter 
should be decided anew: 
"This court has frequently held that, even on 
appeals in equity cases, notwithstanding both 
questions of law and fact are subject to re-
view, the findings of the trial court will not 
be set aside when the evidence is conflicting, 
unless the evidence is clearly insufficient . . . 
All of these cases relate to findings in trials 
on the merits, and the reason on which they 
are based has no application whatever to mo-
tions for new trials. In a trial on the merits 
the witnesses are subject to cross-examina-
tion, and, being in view of the trial judge 
or referee, he has a better opportunity to 
judge of their credibility than the appellate 
court. On a motion for a new trial supported 
and resisted, as in the case at bar, on ex parte 
affidavits, those making the affidavits are 
not subject to cross-examination, and, not be-
ing before the trial judge, his opportunity to 
judge of their credibility and the weight of 
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their statements is no better than the appel-
late court. In all such cases, and in equity 
cases where the evidence consists exclusively 
of depositions, the reason upon which the 
decisions quoted are based fails, and the rule 
established by them has no application to such 
cases." Wright v. Union Pac. R. Co., 22 Utah, 
338, 62 Pac. 317, 318-319 (1900), emphasis 
added. 
Plaintiff submits that the affidavits on file 
herein disclose that Mr. Manning entered the state 
of Utah voluntarily, for the purpose of attending 
to continuing and uncompleted business between 
the plaintiff and defendant, and that no fraud, false 
representations or other deceit were employed to 
induce him to enter Utah for the purpose of serving 
him with process. 
A thorough examination of the cases relating 
to the procurement of service of process by fraudu-
lent enticement, trickery or deceit discloses that the 
courts uniformly apply the following principles: 
(1) In order to quash service on the ground 
of enticement, the evidence must show convincingly 
that plaintiff by false representations, fraud or other 
deceit, induced defendant to enter plaintiff's juris-
diction for the sole purpose of serving him with pro-
cess, and that but for plaintiffs enticement, defend-
ant would not have exposed himself to service. 
Therefore, if plaintiff has demanded or requested 
defendant's presence to accomplish some valid pur-
pose between the parties, or if defendant voluntarily 
enters the state to attend to existing business af-
fairs, service of process is not invalidated by plain-
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tiff's decision to serve defendant while the latter 
is within plaintiff's jurisdiction attending to such 
matters, even though this thought may have been in 
plaintiff's mind when defendant was asked to come. 
Certainly if there is no thought in plaintiff's mind 
of any service of process at the time arrangements 
are made for defendant to come into the state on a 
legitimate business errand, there can be no entice-
ment — and this is the instant case. 
(2) While a defendants Who has entered 
plaintiff's jurisdiction in connection with such legal 
process as attendance at a trial or settlement nego-
tiations is granted an immunity from service of 
process for a reasonable time thereafter, such im-
munity does not extend to private, non-judicial busi-
ness between the parties. 
There appears to be no dispute between the 
parties as to the validity of the foregoing principles. 
Moreover, there appears to be no material conflict 
in the evidence as to the facts to which these prin-
ciples are to be applied. The District Court found 
that Mr. Manning was induced to enter Utah for 
the "sole purpose" of serving him with process. 
Plaintiff contends that the affidavits submitted 
herein cannot possibly support such a finding and 
indeed show conclusively that Mr. Manning's pres-
ence in Utah resulted solely from plaintiff's de-
mands, made in complete good faith, that defend-
ant finish the work it had agreed to perform, and 
that no fraud, false representations or other deceit 
were employed to entice Mr. Manning into Utah 
for the purpose of serving him with process. This 
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is manfestly true from the undisputed facts that, 
when the demands for and the promise and the 
agreement on Manning's part to come were made, 
service of process on Manning was not even contem-
plated by defendant, its officers, employees or at-
torneys. The following application of the foregoing 
legal principles to the uncontroverted facts of this 
case will demonstrate that Mr. Manning was not 
"fraudulently enticed" into Utah by plaintiff. 
The applicable rule of law is clearly stated in 
the recent case of Guzzetta v. Guzzetta, 137 N.E.2d 
419 (Ct. App. Ohio 1956), appeal dismissed, 140 
N.E.2d 213 (Sup. Ct. Ohio 1957), wherein plain-
tiff invited defendant to visit their child, and later 
decided to serve him with process after he had ar-
rived : 
"His (defendant's) coming to Cleveland was 
not induced through trickery, fraud or arti-
fice because it is clear that the invitation was 
extended in good faith and for the purposes 
stated. There is no evidence whatever that the 
plaintiff was resorting to trickery, deceit or 
artifice to get the defendant into this juris-
diction for the purpose of obtaining service 
upon him. To vitiate the personal service of 
summons upon a person in a foreign jurisdic-
tion in response to an invitation extended him 
by a party to the action, an intent to trick and 
deceive him into coming for such purpose 
must have existed in the mind of the sender 
and the invitation itself must have been an 
integral part of the device or artifice employ-
ed to get the defendant into the foreign juris-
diction for the purpose of serving him with 
summons." (137 N.E.2d at p. 421, emphasis 
added). 
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The Guzzetta case discloses at least three essen-
tial elements prerequisite before service of process 
will be quashed on the ground of fraudulent entice-
ment: 
1) An intent to trick and deceive defendant 
into coming to plaintiff's jurisdiction for purposes 
of serving process upon him; 
2) An act on plaintiff's part constituting 
fraud, trickery or deceit; and 
3) A concurrence of such act or intent, by vir-
tue of an invitation made with the intent to trick 
and deceive and constituting an integral part of the 
fraudulent scheme. 
None of these elements exist in the instant 
case. At the time Mr. Kershisnik was making his 
continual demands for Mr. Manning to return to 
Salt Lake City to complete defendant's work, and 
on June 21 when Manning promised and agreed 
to come about June 25 and on June 23 when Man-
ning confirmed he would arrive on June 24, Mr. 
Kershisnik had no knowledge that a complaint was 
being prepared against defendant or that process 
would be served upon Mr. Manning. Mr. Kershis-
nik had no knowledge until June 24, after Mr. Man-
ning had already arranged his arrival in Salt Lake 
City. Other than Mr. Kershisnik, none of plaintiff's 
personnel knew prior to June 24 that Mr. Manning 
would be in Salt Lake City on that date and none 
of plaintiffs personnel knew before June 24 that 
a summons and complaint would be ready for service 
by June 24. Therefore, borrowing from the fore-
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going language of the Guzzetta case, there was no 
intent in the mind of the sender of the invitation 
to trick and deceive Mr. Manning into coming to 
Utah for purposes of serving him. 
Mr. Manning, in his first affidavit, asserts 
that Mr. Kershisnik later admitted to him that he 
had prior knowledge that Mr. Manning would be 
served "that morning and in the hotel room." Mr. 
Kershisnik pointed out in his affidavit that he did 
have knowledge that "service was going to be at-
tempted at some time while Manning was in Salt 
Lake City" but it was not acquired until June 2b, 
after Mr. Manning's a/rrwal had been arranged, and 
that he did not know service "was going to be made 
at his hotel." Mr. Kershisnik^ statement is thus 
easily explained: At the time Mr. Manning was 
served in the hotel room on June 25, Mr. Kershis-
nik did know of plaintiff's decision to serve Mr. 
Manning at some time on June 25, such decision 
having been made by plaintiff on June 24 and the 
knowledge acquired by Kershisnik on that same day. 
But he did not know Where service would be made. 
While Mr. Kershisnik's statement that he had no 
knowledge of service was inaccurate, such inaccur-
acy is immaterial to the issues herein. Any knowl-
edge which Mr. Kershisnik had was not acquired 
until after Mr. Manning's presence in Salt Lake 
City had been promised and arranged, and could 
not therefore, have been any factor in the making 
of these arrangements. 
Another illustrative case directly in point is 
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Ex Parte Taylor, 69 Atl. 553 (R.I. 1908). There, 
plaintiff's employees and agents invited defendant 
to meet with plaintiff-receiver to discuss business 
matters with respect to a receivership of a trust 
company. At the time the invitation was made, these 
employees and agents had no knowledge that plain-
tiff intended to sue and serve defendant with pro-
cess, nor did plaintiff know that the invitation had 
been made. Consequently, the court held that serv-
ice was proper since the invitation was not made 
with the intent to serve defendant, and no fraud or 
other deceit was employed to entice him into plain-
tiff's jurisdiction. 
Similarly, Mr. Kershisnik, when on June 21 
Mr. Manning's presence in Salt Lake City on June 
25 was arranged, had no knowledge that a complaint 
was being prepared or that plaintiff was contem-
plating service of any kind against defendant while 
Manning was to be in Salt Lake City. In fact, on 
June 21, when this arrangement was made, neither 
plaintiff nor its attorneys knew when the complaint 
would be ready for filing and service. Moreover, 
plaintiff and its attorneys did not know on June 21 
that an arrangement had been made for Mr. Man-
ning's presence on June 25. Mannings presence on 
June 25 was learned by plaintiff and its attorneys 
after they made their decision on June 24 to file 
the complaint. The Taylor case fully supports the 
Guzzetta rule that enticement only exists where 
there is a concurrence of fraudulent act and intent. 
Plaintiff's affidavits disclose that no such act or in-
tent existed and that no such concurrence was pre-
sent.
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Under the rules of law above stated, even as-
suming for sake of argument that Mr. Kershisnik 
had known at the times he demanded Mr. Manning's 
presence in Salt Lake City that service would be 
attempted upon him, no fraudulent enticement would 
exist in the absence of proof that Mr. Kershisnik 
or plaintiff's other personnel had an intent to de-
ceive Mr. Manning, and that an act of fraud was 
actually committed. A mere invitation or demand 
for defendant's presence, even though coupled with 
a hope to serve him ( does not constitute fraudulent 
enticement where the invitation or demand was 
made to accomplish some other valid purpose be-
tween the parties, and where no false representa-
tkms Wave been made to induce defendant to enter 
plaintiffs jurisdiction. (1^2 Am. Jur. Process § 35, 
p. 33). As stated by the United States Supreme 
Court in Jaster v. Cnrrie, 198 U.S. 144,148, (1904), 
the mere hope of serving defendant while he is pre-
sent in plaintiff's jurisdiction is immaterial, in the 
absence of proof that plaintiff made false repre-
sentations or committed other deceit or trickery. 
lams v. Tedlock, 204 Pac. 537 (Kan. 1922) 
illustrates the rule that a valid business purpose in-
ducing defendant's presence in plaintiff's jurisdic-
tion precludes a finding of enticement. There, de-
fendant-trustee was notified by one of plaintiff's 
officers to attend a meeting of the trustees in plain-
tiff's county. Defendant was served with process by 
plaintiff while within the county for the purpose 
of attending this meeting. He contended that his 
presence was enticed by fraud. The court disagreed : 
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"No false statement was made to Wilson to 
induce him to go to Junction City. It was the 
duty of the secretary to notify Wilson of the 
meeting of the trustees; it would have been 
an act of bad faith on the part of the secre-
tary not to notify Wilson. As a trustee of the 
gas company, it was Wilson's duty to attend 
that meeting. There was important business 
to be transacted — the employment of attor-
neys to defend in pending litigation — and, 
although that matter was not attended to, the failure to do so did not render the meeting fraudulent." (204 Pac. at 538, emphasis 
added). 
Similarly, it was the duty of Mr. Kershisnik, 
as acting liaison officer between plaintiff, general 
contractor and defendant, to take such steps as he 
thought necessary to insure performance and com-
pletion of the work, such as insisting that defend-
ant's resident architect, Mr. Manning, be present 
"during construction," to verify the completion of 
items of work, approve outstanding invoices and 
issue completion certificates. Clearly this was part 
of the architect's unperformed obligations. It was 
the duty of Mr. Manning, as defendant's representa-
tive, to be present "during construction" and comply 
with Mr. Kershisnik's request to perform such work. 
This is spelled out in the Architect's Agreement be-
tween the parties set forth at pages 2-4 hereof. (See 
R. 78,79,para.c,f-k). 
It is manifest from these contractual provi-
sions that defendant had agreed in a very specific 
form on all of the services which it would render 
"during construction." These include specifically 
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the various things referred to in sub-paragraphs 
(f) through (k) of paragraph 5, of the said 
Architects contract, including the issuance of a 
completion certificate. In addition, the defendant 
agreed that the supervision of these specific 
things which it had agreed to perform would 
require the presence, full-time, in Salt Lake City 
of an authorized representative during the whole of 
the construction period. Defendant's self-serving 
assertions that supervision was no longer required 
after June 10 are thus immaterial, since defendant 
was contractually bound to offer such supervision 
during the entire construction period, whether or 
not defendant thought such supervision was re-
quired. It was the defendant who breached this 
contract by removing the full-time supervision from 
Salt Lake City before all of these items of work 
were completed and fully performed. It would be 
a perversion of the contract and justice to even sug-
gest that it is the plaintiff's responsibility to prove 
that the defendant's presence in Salt Lake City 
was needed when the defendant had already agreed 
in the contract that this was so. Nevertheless, the 
necessity of defendant's presence is elaborately set 
forth in the affidavits of Messrs. Donovan and Ker-
shisnik, referred to hereinabove. Plaintiff also re-
fers the Court to the affidavit of Mr. Charles Peter-
son, construction superintendent for the general 
contractor, Fullmer Bros., with respect to plaintiff's 
project. Mr. Peterson, at pages 2-5, paragraphs 
5-11, of his affidavit, discusses in great detail the 
nature of the work remaining to be performed by 
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defendant, and the importance of completing such 
work prior to the grand opening of the building on 
June 29, 1964. (R. 138-141). 
Mr. Kershisnik having a duty to request the 
presence of Mr. Manning when in his judgment such 
presence was required, and Mr. Manning having a 
duty to be present in Salt Lake City on a full-time 
basis during the construction period, it is clear that 
the latter's presence was neither induced nor even 
invited: It was required by the very nature of the 
business relationship and contractual obligations ex-
isting between the parties. While it may have later 
transpired that the business Which required Mr. 
Manning's presence could not be fully accomplished 
by reason of Mr. Manning's refusal to undertake it, 
as in the lams case, that fact could not invalidate the 
service validly secured by reason of the business and 
contractual relationship hereinabove discussed. 
On the question of whether or not Mr. Man-
ning's presence was required in Salt Lake City by 
virtue of the work remaining uncompleted by de-
fendant, the District Court merely found that when 
Mr. Manning left Salt Lake City on June 10, 1964, 
"the Prudential Building was substantially finished 
and the day-to-day presence of James Manning was 
no longer required." (Amended Judgment, R. 156, 
para. 2). 
Plaintiff has never contended that Mr. Man-
ning's presence was required on a "day-to-day" 
basis after June 10, 1964. Plaintiff does contend 
and the record is clear that after June 10 there 
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remained unperformed several important items of 
work requiring the presence and supervision of de-
fendant or its agent, and that Mr. Kershisnik's re-
peated demands upon Mr. Manning thereafter were 
made in good faith to -accomplish the performance 
of this work prior to the scheduled grand opening 
of the building on June 29, 1964. In fact the Dis-
trict Court found that at all times relevant to this 
issue the defendant was doing business in the State 
of Utah. (Amended Judgment, R. 156, para. 1). 
Plaintiff submits that there is absolutely no 
evidence in defendant's affidavits or pleading that 
Mr. Kershisnik's requests for Mr. Manning's pre-
sence were made in bad faith, without any valid 
business purpose, solely to induce Mr. Manning into 
Salt Lake City for purposes of service of process. 
Indeed, any suggestion of foul play or trickery is 
fully controverted by plaintiff's affidavits and the 
contract between the parties. The affidavits not 
only fail to disclose, but to the contrary negative 
the existence of any scheme or plan aimed at serv-
ing defendant with process. 
Clearly, no such scheme could have existed on 
or before June 21, when Mr. Manning arrived in 
Salt Lake City to discuss business matters with Mr. 
Kershisnik. (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 106, para. 6). 
/ / it had existed, plaintiff could and would have 
served Mr. Manning at this time by service of a 
10 day summons. It should be emphasized that it 
was on June 21, in the presence of Mr. Kershisnik, 
in Salt Lake City, that Mr. Manning arranged for 
a tentative return to Salt Lake City on June 25. It 
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is so improbable as to be beyond belief that this ar-
rangement, made on June 21 in plaintiffs jurisdic-
tion (State of Utah) for Mr. Manning's return to 
Salt Lake City four days later, was part of a fraudu-
lent scheme to entice Mr. Manning back to Salt Lake 
City for purpose of serving him with process. Mr. 
Kershisnik had advance notice of Mr. Manning's 
scheduled arrival in Salt Lake City on June 21 or 
22 and yet no attempt was made to serve him at this 
time. (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 105, 106, para. 5). 
The fact that Mr. Manning was not served with 
summons when he arrived on June 21 precludes any 
finding that plaintiff lured Mr. Manning into Utah 
on June 25 for the sole purpose of serving him with 
process. Plaintiff's decision to serve Mr. Manning 
was not arrived at until after the arrangements for 
his return to Salt Lake City had been concluded. 
These arrangements were made without knowledge 
of and without any relationship to any possible 
service of process. There is no evidence whatsoever 
to the contrary. 
Defendant's burden of persuasion in this case 
is clearly set forth in Crandall v. Trowbridge, 150 
N.W. 669 (Iowa 1915), involving the proof requir-
ed to avoid service of process on the ground of fraud-
ulent enticement: 
"[A]s between honest and dishonest motives 
and purposes we should presume honesty of 
intent and purpose, unless the facts and cir-
cumstances are such as to satisfy the mind 
that the acts and statements relied upon are 
fraudulent or dishonest." (150 N.W. at p. 
670, emphasis added.) 
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Plaintiff submits that the presumption of its 
honesty of intent and purposes has not been rebutted 
or even challenged by defendant herein. As stated 
in a recent case involving fraudulent service of pro-
cess: 
"[A] finding of fraud must rest on something 
more substantial than suspicion, surmise arid 
speculation . . . for the 'precept is that one is 
not permitted to give weight to smoke, and 
suspicion is but smoke.' . . . Furthermore, the 
general rule is that he who asserts fraud has 
the burden of making it manifest. . . and 'if 
in the pursuit of fraud, two judicial views 
are open on the facts, one in favor of honesty, 
the other contra, the law (an invention of 
men for their welfare) but agrees with hu-
man nature in saying we must take the nobler 
view: " (Glaze v. Glaze, 311 S.W.2d 575, 579 
(Ct. App. Mo. 1958), emphasis added). 
For further cases upholding service of process 
upon principles consistent with those discussed here-
inabove see Nowell v. Nowell, 190 A.2d 233 (Super. 
Ct. Conn. 1963); Schwartz v. Artcraft Silk Hosiery 
Mills, 110 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1940); Siro v. Ameri-
can Express Co., 121 Atl. 280 (Conn. 1923); Case 
v. Smith, Lineaweaver & Co., 152 Fed. 730 (E.D. 
N.Y. 1907). 
Defendant submitted to the District Court a 
memorandum of points and authorities whidh cited 
only two cases with respect to the issue of fraudu-
lent enticement, both of which concern the question 
of immunity in settlement situations. Consequently 
neither are controlling nor apposite here. 
Attacks upon the service of process upon non-
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resident defendants fall into two separate cate-
gories : fraudulent enticement, discussed above, and 
immunity during judicial proceedings. This distinc-
tion is made in Restatement of Judgments, Section 
15, Comment (b), at page 81: 
"Where the defendant is brought into the state 
by fraud of the plaintiff, or comes into the 
£tate voluntarily as a witness in or a party 
to the judicial proceedings, he has a privilege 
not to be sued in the state." 
In Western States Refining Co. v. Berry, 6 
U.2d 336, 313 P.2d 480 (1957), this Court extended 
the principle of immunity applicable to judicial pro-
ceedings to situations wherein defendant is within 
plaintiff's jurisdiction for purposes of settlement 
negotiations. This Court did not purport to limit 
or extend the principles relating to fraudulent en-
ticement. The exact holding of the Court is as fol-
lows: 
"One who is invited into a jurisdiction to dis-
cuss compromise and settlement of a disputed 
matter will not be subject to service of pro-
cess in that matter, if he comes into the juris-
diction for the sole purpose of discussing com-
promise and settlement, by the one extending 
the invitation, for a reasonable period involv-
ed in coming to the negotiations and return-
ing therefrom, as well as during the period 
of actual presence at the negotiations, unless 
the party extending the invitation advises 
him at the time the invitation is extended 
that he will be served with process immedi-
ately if settlement negotiations fail." (313 
P.2d at pp. 481-482, emphasis added). 
A brief discussion of the principles upon which 
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the Berry case was decided is sufficient to demon-
strate its inapplicability to the present case. 
First of all, it seems clear that in Berry, this 
Court was merely extending to settlement discus-
sions the general rule whidi confers immunity from 
service of process upon witnesses and parties while 
attending court in a state or county other than that 
of their residence. This analysis of Berry is veri-
fied by an examination of the cases cited therein. 
The court cited Mertens v. McMahon, 66 S.W.2d 
127 (Mo. 1933), which was concerned only with 
the immunity of defendant by reason of his pre-
sence in court on another action brought by plain-
tiff. This Court also cited State ex rel. Elian v. Dis-
trict Court, 33 P.2d 526 (Mont. 1934), wherein the 
court expressly extended the rule of immunity by 
reason of attendance at trial to settlement situations. 
The other cases cited in Berry, Gampel v. Gampel, 
114 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1952), and Ultcht 
v. Ultcht, 126 Atl. 440 (Ct. Ch. N.J. 1924), merely 
hold that where the defendant is invited into plain-
tiff's jurisdiction to discuss settlement of their dif-
ferences, defendant is immune from service for a 
reasonable time thereafter. Therefore, neither the 
opinion in Berry nor the cases upon which it relied 
cases upon wich it relied suggests that the immunity 
rule should be extended further than situations in 
which a non-resident defendant has been induced to 
enter plaintiff's jurisdiction for purposes of settl-
ing and compromising disputes. 
The reason for extending immunity to settle-
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ment situations appears to be reasonable: By reason 
of a plaintiff's offer or agreement to enter into 
negotiations aimed ^t settling disputes between the 
parties, plaintiff has in effect agreed to refrain 
from inimical proceedings until a reasonable time 
.after sudh negotiations have failed. However, where 
defendant's presence is requested to accomplish busi-
ness purposes other than settlement or negotiations, 
plaintiff cannot be deemed to have raised any such 
flag of truce. Thus, in lams v. Tedlock, supra the 
court noted that: 
"Wilson (defendant) knew of the dispute be-
tween himself and the plaintiffs, he ought to 
have known that the dispute might be consid-
ered at the meeting and might develop into 
litigation." (204 Pac. at 538) 
On its facts the Berry case is completely dis-
similar to our situation. In Berry, the defendant was 
a non-resident of the State of Utah, who had never 
done any business in the State of Utah, had no pur-
pose in coming to the State of Utah except at the 
instance of the plaintiff's specific request for a 
settlement discussion, and came to Utah only to dis-
cuss settlement of problems concerning a lease on 
property in the State of Idaho between the parties. 
In our case, defendant had been doing business in 
the State of Utah since at least 1962 for plaintiff 
and other clients, including Brigham Young Uni-
versity. Defendant was still doing such business on 
June 25 when it was served, and still had a substan-
tial amount of business yet to do before its contract 
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with plaintiff would be completed. Defendant had 
been doing this business principally through Mr. 
Manning who resided in Utah, at least until June 
10, 1964. Mr. Manning returned to Utah on June 
24 for the purpose of determining what amount of 
construction work had been performed and what 
still had to be done, and Manning did not return 
to Utah for any discussion of settlement concerning 
any dispute between plaintiff and defendant. There 
is no question that Manning was defendant's agent, 
and there is no question that defendant knew that 
Manning was returning to Utah. There is likewise 
no question that defendant allowed Manning to do 
this with full knowledge that a substantial dispute 
existed between plaintiff and defendant and that 
legal proceedings were imminent against defendant. 
(Amended Judgement, R. 156, para. 2) . 
Since the evidence discloses that Mr. Manning 
returned to the State of Utah on June 24 to per-
form defendant's contractual obligations to plain-
tiff, and that the arrangements for his return were 
made on June 21, at a time when the possibility of 
service upon him was ncrt even contemplated by 
plaintiff. It is clear as a matter of law that no 
fraud, false representations or other deceit were 
employed to entice Mr. Manning into Utah for the 
purpose of serving him. Plaintiff submits that de-
fendants's motion to quash service upon Mr. Man-
ning should have been denied and that the lower 
court's decision granting said motion must be re-
versed. 
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POINT II 
SERVICE UPON THE DEFENDANT BY SERV-
ICE UPON THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF UTAH 
WAS VALID SINCE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRO-
CURE A CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY TO DO BUSI-
NESS IN UTAH AND IS THEREFORE ESTOPPED TO 
DENY ITS DESIGNATION OF THE SECRETARY OF 
STATE AS ITS AGENT. 
It is interesting to notice that a motion to quash 
the service upon the Secretary of State was not even 
before the District Court. Defendant had filed mo-
tions only to quash service upon Manning and upon 
Mooney. The law as to the propriety of this service 
was never briefed for the District Court. Plaintiff's 
first knowledge of any ruling upon or consideration 
of this point by the trial court came when the court's 
order was served upon it. At this stage plaintiff de-
cided there was no purpose to be served in raising 
this procedural point, since the court had already 
ruled on the substantive point, albeit erroneously.1 
Rule 4 (e) (4) of the Uta!h Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure permits service of process upon any corpora-
tion to be made by serving any "agent authorized 
by appointment or by law to receive service of pro-
cess." 
Utah Code Ann., Section 16-10-102 (1953) as 
amended, provides in part that: 
"No foreign corporation shall have the right 
1. The sole basis given by the court for the ruling on this issue 
is that the service was not permitted by the Utah Statutes or 
rules of Procedure. The erroneous rule of "no further service when 
a motion to quash is pending", which the court followed in quash-
ing service on Mooney obviously could not apply to the service on 
the Secretary of State. This is because service on the Secretary of 
State was made on July 1, 1964 (E. 26), and defendant's motion 
to quash service on Manning was not filed until July 14, 1964 
(R. 27). 
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to transact business in this state until it shall 
have procured a certificate of authority so 
to do from the Secretary of State." 
Section 16-10-106 (d) requires the foreign 
corporation to state in its application for a certifi-
cate of authority the name and address of its pro-
posed registered agent in Utah. 
Section 16-10-111 provides that the registered 
agent so appointed shall be an agent of the corpor-
ation upon whom service of process may be served. 
This section also provides as follows: 
"Whenever a foreign corporation authorized 
to transact business in this state shall fail 
to appoint or maintain a registered agent in 
this state, or whenever any such registered 
agent cannot with reasonable diligence be 
found at the registered office, or Whenever 
the certificate of authority of a foreign cor-
poration shall be suspended or revoked, then 
the secretary of state shall be an agent of such 
corporation upon whom any such process, no-
tice or demand may be served." 
While defendant was never authorized to transact 
business in Utah, it is clear that defendant is 
estopped to rely upon its admitted failure to qualify 
to do business in Utah, as a means of defeating the 
state's jurisdiction over it. This rule has been re-
cited in numerous cases involving statutes of other 
states substantially identical to section 16-10-111, 
and this rule is clearly the majority view, as stated 
in 23 Am. Jur., Foreign Corporations, section 499, 
page 513: 
"There is a difference of opinion on the ques-
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tion whether a foreign corporation doing busi-
ness within the state without complying with 
a statute requiring, as a condition perecedent, 
the designation of a state official to accept 
service of process ought, under the applicable 
state statutes, to be held bound by service on 
such official. The weight of authority sup-
ports the view that by doing business in the 
state, the corporation necessarily submits to 
the service of process against it on the offi-
cer whom it must have designated had any 
designation been made, and is estopped to 
deny that it has made the designation pro-
vided the suit is one to which the state may 
subject such corporations doing business in 
its territory." (Emphasis Added). 
As stated in Old Wayne Life Ass'n. v. McDon-
ough, 204 U. S. 8, 21-22 (1907) : 
"Undoubtedly, it was competent for Pennsyl-
vania to declare that no insurance corpora-
tion should transact business within its limits 
without filing the written stipulation speci-
fied in its statute . . . It is equally true that 
if an insurance corporation of another state 
stransacts business in Pennsylvania without 
complying with its provisions it will be deem-
ed to have assented to any valid terms pre-
scribed by that Commonwealth as a condition 
of its right to do business there; and it will 
be estopped to say that it had not done what 
it should have done in order that it might 
lawfully enter that Commonwealth and there 
exert its corporate powers. (Emphasis add-
ed). 
In Flinn v. Western Mut. Life Ass'n, 171 N.W. 
711 (Iowa 1919), the court followed the rule in the 
Old Wayne Life Assyn case, supra, in upholding ser-
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vice of process upon the state auditor against a for-
eign insurance company which had failed to comply 
with the following statute, which provided in per-
tinent part: 
"Every life insurance company . . . shall, be-
fore receiving a certificate to do business in 
this state or any renewal thereof, file in the 
office of the auditor of state an agreement 
in writing that thereafter service of notice 
or process of any kind may be made on the 
auditor of state, and when so made shall be 
valid, binding and effective for all purposes 
as if served upon the company according to 
the laws of this or any other state, and waiv-
ing all claim or right of error by reason of 
such acknowledgment of service.'' 
By its terms, the statute applied only to foreign 
corporations Which filed the requisite agreement 
before receiving a certificate of authority. However, 
the court held that defendant Was estopped to deny 
its compliance with the statute: 
"Compliance with the requirements of this 
section having been obligatory upon the de-
fendant every day for that last 20 years, it 
is obligatory upon it now. Because it was and 
is obligatory, it will be conclusively presumed 
as against the corporation that it did comply 
with such requirements, and its rights will 
be determined on the theory of such compli-
ance.'
9
 (171 N.W. at 713, emphasis added). 
The court in North American Union v. Oliphint, 
217 S.W. 1 (Ark. 1919) reached a similar result: 
"It is first insisted by appellant that the court 
erred in refusing to quash the service of sum-
mons upon it. The summons was served upon 
the state insurance commissioner, under Act 
462, Acts of the General Assembly of 1917. 
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That Act requires fraternal benefit societies, 
as a prerequisite to obtaining a license to do 
business in the state, to appoint the superin-
tendent of insurance their agent upon whom 
legal process might be served. No such ap-
pointment was made; hence appellant had no 
license to do business in the state. It follows 
that the superintendent of insurance was not 
appellant's agent, upon whom service might 
be had, and the service was invalid, unless ap-
pellant is estopped to deny service, by hav-
ing done business in the state in violation of 
the statute. If appellant was doing business 
in the state, it was violating the statute, and 
is estopped to deny that it had a license or 
that the superintendent of insurance ivas its 
agent for purposes of service." (217 S.W. 
at 5, emphasis added). Accord: Ehrman v. 
Teutonia Ins. Co., 1 Fed. 471, 476-477 (D. 
Ark. 1880). 
In Brown v. Globe Laboratories, 84 N.W.2d 
•151 (Neb. 1957), the court upheld service of pro-
cess upon the Secretary of State under section 21-
1201 of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska, which 
provides in pertinent part: 
". . . Such foreign corporation shall also make 
and file a certificate . . . appointing an agent 
or agents in this state, who shall be desig-
noted by his official title, and one of whom 
shall reside at such principal place of busi-
ness, upon whom process . . . may be served; 
and such service of process or of any such 
other legal notice as aforesaid upon the Sec-
retary of State . . . ,or upon any such agent 
or agents, shall constitute valid service upon 
such corporation . . . ." 
While the section on its face applies only to 
corporations which filed the requisite certificate 
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of appointment as a condition to qualifying to do 
business in Nebraka, such substituted service was 
held proper upon all foreign corporations which 
transact business in the state: 
"Even though a foreign corporation has not 
expressly consented to such jurisdiction but 
is actually doing business in this state, then a 
valid service of process may be made against 
it upon the Secretary of State." (84 N.W.2d 
at 157). 
In Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corporation, 300 N.W. 
840 (Neb. 1941), the court upheld service of pro-
cess upon the auditor of public accounts under a 
similar statute, as against defendant foreign cor-
poration which had failed to qualify or appoint a 
resident agent. Accord: Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Cor-
poration, 117 F.2d 488, 490 (8th Cir. 1941). 
The courts of South Dakota have uniformly 
applied the principal of estoppel to prevent a foreign 
corporation from taMng advantage of its own fail-
ure to comply with state law as a means of avoid-
ing substituted service of process. In Clay v. Kent 
Oil Co., 38 N.W.2d 258 (S.D. 1949), the court 
stated the rule as follows: 
"Having failed to do that which our law re-
quired of it as conditions under which it was 
to be or may have been permitted by license 
to transact business in this state, appellant 
now says that such failure on its part has re-
sulted in a denial to respondent of that re-
course which the law of the state demanded 
that it maintain for respondent's aid and 
benefit . . . [W]e think it proper to hold that 
if a foreign corporation fails to comply with 
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the laws of this state, but is still engaged in 
business therein, and permitted to carry on 
such business, it must transact its business 
here subject to the laws of the state, and its 
assent to service upon the Secretary of State 
is implied. See authorities cited in note 2, 113 
A.L.R. 16. It is observed that our code, SDC 
11.2002, denied to appellant the right to trans-
act business in this state until such time as 
it should comply with the provisions of SDC 
11.20. Having voluntarily assumed the right 
to engage in business in South Dakota we 
think that appellant should not now be heard 
to say that it did not authorize the Secretary 
of State to act for it in the formal matter of 
accepting a summons, an outgrowth of the 
exercise of such assumed right. We recognize 
that this view is not universally adopted, as 
is made to appear in 23 Am. Jur., Foreign 
Corporations, §§ 495 and 499. However, our 
review of the question induces an adherence 
to the rule quoted from the former opinion 
of this court and leads us to the belief that the 
decided weight of authority sustains the valid-
ity of the service employed to bring appellant 
into court." (38 N.W.2d at 259-260, empha-
sis added). 
Accord: Uhlich v. Hilton Mobile Homes, 126 
N.W.2d 813, 816 (S.D. 1964). 
The principle of estoppel has been employed in 
like circumstances by the Suoreme Court of Utah. 
Wein v. Crockett, 113 U t ^ l 9 5 P.2d 222, 231 
(1948), involved the application of Section 104-5-11 
(10) Utah Code Ann. (1943), whMi section pro-
vided for service of process upon the manager, sup-
erintendant or agent designated by the non-resident 
in a certificate to be filed with the Secretary of 
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State. Plaintiff contended that since he had never 
appointed any person in Utah as his agent for pur-
poses of service of process, service upon one of his 
agents was improper. The court stated the applic-
able rule as follows : 
"Plaintiff was required to designate an agent 
on the effective date of the act, and his failure 
to comply with the law cannot be used as a 
reason for defeating defendant's right to 
claim the benefit of the statute. Not having 
designated an agent, plaintiff cannot be heard 
to complain, if the agent served is one desig-
nated by statute. Even though plaintiff, at 
the time he entered into the contract with the 
defendant, did not impliedly consent to be 
sued in the courts of this state, by continuing 
to operate his business after the act became 
effective he impliedly consented to being serv-
ed in the manner provided by the act . . " 
(195 P.2d at 231, emphasis added). 
By transacting business in Utah without a cer-
tificate of authority, defendant is estopped to rely 
upon its failure to comply with the law in order to 
defeat plaintiff's right to claim the benefit of sec-
tion 16-10-111, U.C.A. 1953, and defendant has 
impliedly consented to substituted service upon the 
Secretary of State. It would indeed be an anomalous 
situation if a violation of the law is to be recognized 
•as a basis for depriving the courts of this state of 
jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of 
the lawbreaker's activities in this state. If this is 
the law, Why should any corporation ever qualify 
to do business? This court has already expressed 
its opinion on this general subject in Wein v. Croc-
kett, supra, when it stated at p. 314: 
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"If the cause of action arises in this state, out 
of business being transacted in this state, the 
probabilities are that the witnesses will be 
readily available here; the law of this state 
will control and determine the cause of ac-
tion ; and the courts here would be the forums 
of convenience for the trial of the action. To 
require a resident who is transacting busi-
ness in this locality to commence his action in 
a foreign jurisdiction on a cause of action 
arising here, and transport his witnesses to 
other states would make protection of his 
right prohibitive and would, in effect, permit 
nonresidents to continue in business in this 
state immune from legal responsibilty. To re-
quire a nonresident to defend where he com-
mits the alleged wrong is not an unreason-
able imposition. (Emphasis added.) 
The court summarized the rationale of its de-
cision at page 316: 
"While under the present law our legis-
lature cannot deny a person a right to trans-
act business in this state it can, pursuant to 
its police power, license and regulate the busi-
ness carried on. We are convinced under the 
present day extensions of business into the 
various states and the rapidity of commuting 
interstate, that the narrow principles of the 
early cases must be re-examined in the light 
of modern conditions, and that this state to 
properly protect its citizens must have a right 
to siibject nonresidents, who maintain offices 
and transact business herein, to be subject 
to the jurisdiction of our courts if an agent 
upon whom process can be served is still in 
the employment of the nonresident and if the 
cause of action arises out of the business 
transacted here." 
Plaintiff submits that under the facts of this 
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case the law of Utah not only permits but requires 
that a service of process upon the Secretary of State 
be held valid. The ruling of the trial court must 
be reversed. 
POINT III 
SERVICE UPON DEFENDANT BY PERSONAL 
SERVICE UPON MR. MOONEY WAS VALID SINCE 
THE FILING OF A MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF 
SUMMONS DOES NOT IMPAIR THE RIGHT TO SERVE 
ADDITIONAL SUMMONS UPON DEFENDANT. 
The District Court held that service of sum-
mons upon Mr. Mooney was void since it was made 
while defendant's motion to quash service upon Mr. 
Manning was pending. 
Reference to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
discloses no such restriction upon a plaintiff's right 
to perfect service of process by issuance of two or 
more separate summons upon defendant. Rule 4 (a) 
provides as follows: 
"The summons may be signed and issued by 
the plaintiff or his attorney. A summons shall 
be deemed to have issued when placed in the 
hands of a qualified person for the purpose 
of service. Separate summonses may be issued 
and served" (Emphasis added). 
This rule must be "liberally construed to se-
cure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 
of every action." (Rule 1). The District Court's 
ruling herein, if upheld, would promote an opposite 
result entirely. First, by the simple expedient of 
filing a motion to quash, and escaping from the jur-
isdiction while such motion is pending, defendant 
could prevent plaintiff from ever perfecting an in-
complete or defective service. Secondly, even where 
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the defendant remains amenable to further process, 
unnecessary delay results from requiring plaintiff 
to withhold further service until the motion to quash 
is determined. Clearly, the District Court's ruling 
if adopted would result in much unnecessary litiga-
tion. The parties should not be required to suffer 
the expense and delay of litigating questions such 
as are involved in Points 1 and 2 hereof, when such 
litigation is rendered unnecessary by another serv-
ice upon defendant. 
There is no authority whatsoever for holding 
that the filing of a motion to quash impairs the right 
to issue further summons. Under Utah Rule 4 (a), 
the summons is issued by plaintiff or his attorney, 
and thus is not a writ of the court requiring judicial 
action. In effect, the summons is a mere notice, in-
forming defendant that a suit has been filed against 
him. Defendant should not be permitted to raise 
alleged defects in one such notice and meanwhile to 
ignore further notice containing no such alleged de-
fects. 
A case directly on point is Lane v. Ball, 160 
Pac. 144 (Ore. 1916), rev'd on other grounds 
on rehearing, 163 Pac. 975 (1917). There, plain-
tiff served summons upon several defendants, who 
moved to quash service on the ground that no copies 
of the complaint were served therewith. While this 
motion was pending, plaintiff served a second set 
of summons upon these defendants. After defend-
ant's' motion to quash the first set of summons was 
granted, defendants moved to quash the second sum-
mons on the grounds that "the return of the first 
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summons did not state that they were, or either of 
them was, not found, and that when the second sum-
mons was issued there was pending in such court, 
and undetermined, motions to quash the first sum-
mons and the service thereof" (160 Pac. at 146, 
emphasis added). 
After discussing matters not pertinent hereto, 
the court concluded as follows: 
"It remains to be seen Whether or not, after 
the return of the original summons, showing 
all the defendants to have been found by the 
sheriff, the plaintiffs counsel could, without 
leave of court, lawfully issue another sum-
mons . . . A summons issued by the plaintiff 
or his attorney in an action instituted in a 
court of record in Oregon is not 'process' with-
in the meaning of that word as used in our 
Code . . . Under the practice prevailing in 
this state, a summons, not being process, is 
nothing more than a mere notice to the de-
fendant in a suit or action instituted in a 
court of record, warning him that if he fail 
to appear and answer the complaint within 
the time limited judgment will be taken 
against him for the sum demanded, or that 
the plaintiff will apply to the court for the 
relief prayed for in the initiatory pleading. 
As a summons, whether served personally or 
by publication pursuant to an order therefore, 
is, in every instance, subscribed by the plain-
tiff or his attorney, the issuing of a second 
or a subsequent summons is not an alias or 
pluries writ, and hence need not contain the 
clause 'as we have heretofore commanded 
you\ or, 'as we hive often commanded you9, 
since such notice in a court of record is not 
issued by the clerk.... Though the question is 
not here involved, it is believed a plaintiff or 
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his attorney, at the commencement of a suit 
or action in a court of record, may, if neces-
sary, issue as many summonses as he elects, 
and thereafter file in court only the notices, 
from the returns of which it appears that one 
or more of the defendants has been served. 
The course suggested would be advantageous 
to a plaintiff when a defendant was attempt-
ing to flee the state so as to avoid the personal 
service upon him of a summons and a certi-
fied copy of the complaint in a law action. 
But hoivever this may be, the plaintiffs coun-
sel herein ivhen he ascertained a mistake had 
been made in failing to have copies of the 
complaint served upon any of the defendants 
execpt White, had the right, at any time be-
fore the statute of limitations had run against 
his client's right, to issue another summons 
and cause it and certified copies of the com-
plaint to be served upon the parties as to 
whom the prior attempted service was inef-
fectual." (160 Pac. at 148-150, emphasis 
added). 
Therefore, where the summons is issued by the 
plaintiff or his attorney, rather than by the clerk 
or the court itself, plaintiff has the right to serve 
additional summons at any time prior to the expira-
tion of the statutory period, whether or not a motion 
to quash a prior summons is pending. A like result 
was reached in Washington, under a similar statute 
allowing service of summons by plaintiff or his at-
torney. In Roznik v. Becker, 122 Pac. 593, 595 
(Wash. 1912), the court stated that: 
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" . . . in this state a summons is in no sense 
a writ of court. It is not even issued by the 
court or the clerk thereof; but on the con-
trary, is issued by the plaintiff in the action 
or by his attorney. The summons is in effect 
a mere notice, and hence there is no reason 
for holding that the issuance of one such no-
tice in an action exhausts the power to issue 
another. The essential requirement to obtain 
jurisdiction over the person of a defendant 
is that he be served with a summons in the 
form and in the manner prescribed by the 
statute, not that he be served with any parti-
cular summons. The fact that the appellant 
W€LS served with a summons other than the 
one first issued does not therefore render the 
service void." (Emphasis added). 
Defendant cited the case of Farris v. Walter, 
31 Pac. 231 (Ct. App. Colo. 1892) as contrary to 
the above discussed rule. In Farris, plaintiff served 
defendant with defective summons. Defendant mov-
ed to quash the service, and plairitif served defend-
ant with a second summons which corrected the de-
fect in the first. Defendant failed to respond to this 
second service. The trial court improperly denied 
the motion to quash the first summons and ialso 
entered a default judgment against defendant for 
failure to respond to the second summons. 
The court of appeals reversed the default judg-
ment on the ground that defendant's time within 
which to respond to the second summons did not be-
gin to run until the motion to quash had been deter-
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mined. It should be emphasized that the court did 
not hold that the issuance of the second summons 
was improper in any way. The court merely held 
that defendant did not have to respond to this sum-
mons "while his motion to quash was pending", and 
that defendant should have been "entitled to time 
to answer or demur to the complaint, or to take such 
other action as he deemed proper, before default 
and final judgment should have been entered." (31 
Pac. at 232). Therefore, the court in fact recog-
nized the validity of the second summons, holding in 
effect that but for the trial court's improper entry 
of default, defendant would have been required to 
respond to the second summons. 
The Farris case in no way conflicts with the 
rules of law later established in Lane v. Ball, supra, 
and in Roznik v. Becker, supra, that where summons 
is issued by plaintiff or his (attorney, further sum-
mons may be issued despite the pendency of a mo-
tion to quash former summons. In view of the in-
justice, delay and expense which would arise if a 
contrary procedure were adopted, plaintiff submits 
that the foregoing rule should be followed herein 
and that service of summons upon Mr. Mooney be 
held valid. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit to this Honorable Court that the de-
cision of the District Court is contrary to establish-
ed legal principles and is not supported by the evi-
dence herein. We respectfully ask the Court to re-
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verse the decision of the District Court and to re-
instate the service of process upon the defendant 
William L. Pereira & Associates, a corporation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANKLIN RITER 
822 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
EARL P. STATEN 
604 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
THELEN, MARRIN, JOHNSON & 
BRIDGES 
111 Sutter Street 
San Francisco, California 
Of 'Counsel 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
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